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ABSTRACT: Several theorists of justice have called attention to a vitiating
contradiction besetting John Rawls’s treatment of “primary goods” and their relation to
“lifeplan”-satisfaction among persons. Rawls effectively claims, these critics observe,
that (1) primary goods indices are interpersonally ordinally equivalent; (2) primary goods
indices and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are intrapersonally ordinally
equivalent; and (3) degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are not interpersonally
ordinally equivalent. These three claims are jointly inconsistent. John Roemer, in
particular, shows them so via an elementary function-theoretic proof by reductio ad
absurdum.
A natural objection that a Rawlsian might be tempted to offer to Roemer and
other critics is that a standard mathematical (or any other) proof by reductio in the
present context is illicit. For such proofs proceed implicitly on the basis of semantic
bivalence and the Law of Excluded Middle. And a claim of interpersonal
incomparability, such as (3), implicitly rejects at least one of these classical logical
“laws” via its treatment of certain prospective comparisons as simply undefined, hence,
semantically empty.
It is therefore a matter of some interest that a somewhat “softened” version of the
Rawlsian contradiction is derivable in all of the familiar three-valued, supervaluational,
intuitionist and modal logics that reject bivalence, Excluded Middle or both. As a
number of formal proofs offered in the present article demonstrate, the tension in Rawls’s
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treatment of primary goods and their relation to the successful pursuit of lifeplans is
“deep” and robust.
But it turns out that Rawls is spared contradiction, and his intentions to present a
“political, not metaphysical” conception of justice best carried out, when, pace Rawls
himself, both the second and third listed Rawlsian propositions are reformalized pursuant
to a nonclassical logic. Such logics indeed appear, even for reasons apart from
consistency, to constitute the most appropriate means by which to model Rawls’s
politico-pragmatic understanding of the appropriate distribuendum – an index of primary
goods – and its relation to citizens’ plural conceptions of the good in a liberal theory of
justice. A broader lesson is that nonstandard logics offer the best means of modeling
relations among propositions postulated by any similarly – epistemically or “politically”
– modest, “pragmatic” conception of justice or political morality.

1. Introduction
In his remarkable survey of theories of distributive justice, John Roemer
demonstrates a critical inconsistency in John Rawls’s treatment of “primary goods” and
their relation to “lifeplan”-satisfaction among persons.1 In a thoughtful draft article now
folded into a separate piece co-authored with the present writer, Mathias Risse
conditionally endorses Roemer’s finding, and argues that one of the three Rawlsian
claims serving as premises of the derived contradiction both a) is the only one that might
plausibly be dropped, and b) can indeed safely be dropped, without thereby vitiating
Rawls’s basic understanding of primary goods and their role in a political/contractarian
theory of justice.2
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The three Rawlsian premises, as characterized (though not in all cases as worded)
by Roemer and Risse, are that: 1) primary goods indices are interpersonally ordinally
equivalent; 2) primary goods indices and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are
intrapersonally ordinally equivalent; and 3) degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are
not interpersonally ordinally equivalent.
Intuitively, the inconsistency argument runs: If two people’s primary goods
indices must, ceteris paribus, either rise, fall or remain unchanged together when the two
people hold identical ordered pairs of consecutively held bundles (1), and if each of these
person’s degree or level of lifeplan-satisfaction must, ceteris paribus, rise, fall or remain
unchanged with his primary goods index (2), then by transitivity of the equivalence
relation the two people’s degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction must themselves,
ceteris paribus, surely rise, fall or remain unchanged together (with their primary goods
indices) as well – which is inconsistent with (3). Formally, the derivation of the
inconsistency found by Roemer and endorsed by Risse takes the character of an
elementary function-theoretic proof by reductio.
Now a natural, if perhaps somewhat radical, objection that a Rawlsian might be
tempted to offer to Roemer and Risse is that a standard mathematical proof by reductio in
the present context is illicit. For such proofs proceed implicitly on the basis of semantic
bivalence and the Law of Excluded Middle (or tertium non datur).3 And a claim of
interpersonal incomparability, such as (3), implicitly rejects bivalence and/or Excluded
Middle via its treatment of certain prospective comparisons as simply undefined – hence,
of prospective claims stating such comparisons as semantically empty or indeterminate.
(Interpersonal comparisons would lack standard semantic valuations – truth or falsity –
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rather as expressions of the form “∀/0” lack numerical referents or fail to connote
functions defined over certain salient domains, and thus as sentential units containing
such expressions themselves lack standard semantic valuations.)
Another natural, if rather less radical, objection initially open to Rawlsians is that
Rawls’s statement of the relation between primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction –
premise (2) – is misformalized in the Roemer and earlier Risse discussions. For as he
states the relation, Rawls’s understanding of it looks to be not one of equivalence, but one
of simple entailment – i.e., not of biconditionality, but of uniconditionality. The
implicative relation runs from primary goods to satisfaction, but not from satisfaction to
primary goods.4 (Of course, it therefore also would run, by contraposition, from the
denial of satisfaction to the denial of primary goods; but that is not equivalence, and even
contraposition might be jeopardized if bivalence and/or tertium non datur were denied.5)
It is therefore a matter of some interest that (a somewhat softened version of) the
inconsistency derived by Roemer and endorsed by Risse also is derivable in sundry threevalued, supervaluational, intuitionist and modal logics – and this even when proposition
(2) is weakened to a uni-, rather than a bi-, conditional characterization of the relation
between primary goods indices and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction. I provide a
number of representative such derivations in the present paper. Part 2 derives the
contradiction in standard first-order quantificational calculus – the logical counterpart to
Roemer’s function-theoretic argument. Part 3 derives the contradiction in several wellestablished 3-valued logics – those of Łukasciewicz, Bočvar, Smiley, Kleene and
Woodruff. Part 4 indicates how the preceding proofs carry-over into, e.g., van Fraassen
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supervaluational logic, Heyting intuitionist (or “epistemic”) logic, and the standard S4
modal logic.
Each of Parts 3 and 4 briefly explains the possible reasons that, and the senses in
which, the particular formalisms employed might be thought suitably to express the
Rawlsian intuition that degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are interpersonally
incommensurable. In Part 5 I conclude that these results, far from constituting mere
formal curiosities, bring into particularly sharp relief the deeply problematic nature both
(a) of Rawls’s treatment of primary goods and their relation to lifeplan-satisfaction
among persons, and (b) indeed of any claim simultaneously involving pessimism (or in
Risse’s case, optimism) about the interpersonal tractability or salience, and optimism (or
in Risse’s case, pessimism) about the intrapersonal tractability or salience, of the
“subjective element” of well-being.6 For it turns out that the contradiction is avoided,
and a coherent rationale for charitably revising the set of Rawlsian premises best
articulated, only when the second Rawlsian premise is recast (not dropped, pace Risse)
with the third, for essentially the same reasons, in effectively trivalent form.
In effect, the contradiction dealt with here is simply a case study of a more
general point. The broader lesson here is that certain nonstandard logics offer a
potentially useful means of modeling relations among propositions postulated by any
epistemically or “politically” modest conception of justice or political morality.

2. Standard, Two-Valued First Order Formalization
The derivation of Roemer’s inconsistency in standard, two-valued first order
quantificational logic is quite straightforward. The proof that follows makes use of the
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following familiar sentential operators, connectives and quantifiers7: (The conversant
reader may of course skip over or skim the remainder of this paragraph.) For “¬” read
“not,” or “it is not the case that.” (I thus use “¬” only as a sentential operator, not as a
direct modifier of predicate expressions or as immediately forming class-complements.
The same holds for the next four operators.) For “∧” read “and.” For “∨” read “or.” For
“⊃” read “implies,” or “entails”; hence for “∀ ⊃ ∃” read “∀ implies/entails ∃,” or “if ∀
then ∃,” or “∀ only if ∃.” For “∀ ≡ ∃” read “∀ and ∃ imply/entail one another,” or “∀ if
and only if ∃.” For “∀x: …,” read “for all x’s, …”; hence, e.g., for “∀x,y: xΜy” read
“for all x’s and all y’s, xΜy,” or “all x’s and y’s stand in the Μ relation.” For “∃x: …,”
read “There is an x such that …”; hence, e.g., for “∃x,y: xΜy” read “for some x and some
y, xΜy,” or “some x and y stand in the Μ relation.” (I introduce two particular “Μ
relations” below.) I generally separate “atomic” sentential components of longer, more
complex “molecular” sentences by means of dots rather than repeated parentheses. More
dots accompanying a connective indicate that the connective possesses a broader scope.
Thus, for “∀ ⊃ ∃ .≡. ( ⊃ ∗,” read “(∀ ⊃ ∃) ≡ (( ⊃ ∗)”; for “∀ ⊃ ∃ .: ⊃ :. ( :v: ∗ .⊃. , ∧ .,”
read “(∀ ⊃ ∃) ⊃ (( v (∗ ⊃ (, ∧ .))),” etc.
For ease of exposition and ready intuitability of what are, after all, some rather
elementary formal statements, I also adopt two specialized relational operators (stand-in’s
for “Μ” above) to characterize relations between 1) pairs of primary goods bundles
hypothetically held by separate persons; 2) pairs of primary goods bundles hypothetically
held by, and associated pairs of degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction thereby yielded
to, individual persons; and 3) pairs of degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction
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hypothetically achieved by separate persons: For “>o/i,” read “objectively equals or
exceeds for person i.” For “>s/i,” read “subjectively equals or exceeds for person i.”
For “objectively” here, one might just as well read “interpersonally” or
“intersubjectively”; and for “subjectively” one might just as well read “intrapersonally.”
I intend no more metaphysically controversial distinction than that which I take to be
implicit in Rawls’s treatment of primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction, and which I take
to underwrite Roemer’s (and Risse’s) use of the distinct functional expressions “:i (x)”
and “ui (x)” respectively to represent the primary goods index number and degree or level
of lifeplan-satisfaction associated with individual i’s holding the primary goods bundle
x.8 By twice indexing the single relational term “>” rather than once indexing each of
two separate functional operators such as “: (x)” and “u (x),” I hope (with perhaps a dash
of heuristic optimism) to render the formal derivations that follow both easier on the eye
and readily verbalized in simple English at no cost to critical detail.
The “readily verbalized” versions of Rawls’s three claims concerning primary
goods and lifeplan-satisfaction can be named and informally stated as follows:

1) Primary Goods–to–Goods (“Objective”) Ordinal Equivalence: Any one primary
goods bundle objectively equals or exceeds another such bundle for me if and
only if it does so likewise for you – irrespective of who “you” and “I” are.
2) Primary Goods–to–Satisfaction (“Objective”/”Subjective”) Ordinal QuasiEquivalence (i.e., Entailment): Any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or
exceeds another such bundle for me (or for you) only if it objectively equals or
exceeds that other bundle for me (or for you) – irrespective of who “you” are or
“I” am.
3) Non Satisfaction–to–Satisfaction (“Subjective”) Ordinal Equivalence: It is not
(necessarily) the case that any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or
exceeds another such bundle for me if and only if it does so for you – irrespective
of who “you” and “I” are.9
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The three Rawlsian claims can be formalized, in the notation explicated supra, as
follows. Let the variables x and y range over primary goods bundles, and the variables i,
j and k over persons. Then:
1) ∀x,y,i,j: x >o/i y ≡ x >o/j y.
2) ∀x,y,k: x >o/k y ⊃ x >s/k y.
3) ¬∀x,y,i,j: x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y.
Inconsistency among the set of propositions (1) through (3) is readily derived as
follows: First, by assumption with a view to the familiar rule of universal-elimination,
4) let x = m, y = n, k = a,
so that, by (2) and (4),
5) m >o/a n ⊃ m >s/a n.
Again by assumption and universal-elimination,
6) let k = b,
so that, by (2) and (6),
7) m >o/b n ⊃ m >s/b n.
Once more by universal-elimination,
8) let i = a, and j = b,
so that, by (1), (4) and (8),
9) m >o/a n ≡ m >o/b n.
Now assume:
10) m >o/a n.
Then by (9) and the definition of material equivalence as conjoined implications, and by
conjunction- elimination and implication-elimination,
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11) m >o/b n.
But then by (7) and implication-elimination,
12) m >s/b n.
Now, by (3) and by dint of familiar logical relations obtaining between the existential
quantifier, the universal quantifier, and the sentential negation operator, and of course
still assuming bivalence,
13) ∃x,y,i,j: ¬(x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y).
Thus, by dint of familiar logical relations among the sentential negation, conjunction, and
implication operators,
14) ∃x,y,i,j: x >s/i y .∧. ¬ x >s/j y :∨: ¬ x >s/i y .∧. x >s/j y.
Now again by assumption, this time with a view to existential-elimination,
15) let x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b,
so that by (14) and (15),
16) m >s/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n :∨: ¬ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n.
Now by (12) and the familiar rule of negation-elimination (assuming bivalence)), we
know that
17) ¬¬ m >s/b n.
So we know, by conjunction-elimination, that the first disjunct of (16) does not hold –
that is, we know that
18) ¬( m >s/a n .∧. ¬m >s/b n).
So by (16), (18) and disjunction-elimination, we have
19) ¬ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n.
And thus in particular, by conjunction-elimination, we have
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20) ¬ m >s/a n.
But by (5) and (10) we have
21) m >s/a n,
which of course contradicts (20).
Apart from rejecting bivalence or tertium non datur, the only specific objection to
this derivation that I can envisage being offered by a Rawlsian is to the use of universalelimination both to let k = a, then b, and to let i = a and j = b. But this would not be a
logical objection; and in fact it would amount to a denial of the Rawlsian premises
themselves. Because premises (1) through (3) are universally quantified and their bound
variables i, j and k taken to range over all persons, there simply is no formal reason for
prohibiting any two – or even all three – of the variables i, j, and k from taking the same
value. And assuming bivalence, to impose any restriction on any two such variables’
taking the same value would be none other than to deny the universality of (at least) one
of the premises – i.e., to deny (at least) one of those premises themselves. (We should
have, that is, to say that the people for whom primary goods are interpersonally
(“objectively”) ordinally equivalent cannot be the people for whom they and the lifeplansatisfaction they yield are intrapersonally (“objectively/subjectively”) ordinally quasiequivalent. I.e., we should have to say that premises (1) and (2) cannot be said of the
same people.)10 The only conceivable Rawlsian way out, then, would appear to be to
depart from classical bivalence or tertium non datur.

3. Three-Valued First Order Formalizations
Significantly, the “conceivable” way out proves not to be a felicitous way out.
We can derive counterparts to the classical inconsistency just proved among Rawls’s
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three premises in all of the familiar, plausibly applicable three-valued logics, as well as in
all other plausible non-classical candidates sketched in the next two Parts. In this Part I
restrict myself to the trivalent logics. A brief word might first be in order on why one
might be tempted to employ a third semantic value in modeling the three Rawlsian
premises and their logical relations. (The reader is asked to skip over or skim the next
subpart if well familiar with the standard reasons for rejecting classical logic.)

3.1. Canonical Reasons for Rejecting Bivalence
“Third” semantic values typically are proposed as means of formally recognizing
the possibility that syntactically well-formed statements might be neither true nor false.
(They also are offered as means of assigning unique semantic values to “meaningless” or
“nonsensical” – i.e., to syntactically non-well-formed – sentences, when such sentences
are dignified with the term “sentences” at all; and as “pragmatic” revisions to classical
logic made with a view to accommodating challenges posed to the distributive laws by
quantum theory. But these cases need not detain us; I can envisage no interesting
Rawlsian analogue to either of them.11) There are of course several well-known means
by which a well-formed sentence may come to appear to lack a determinate classical
truth-value:
1. “Paradoxical” specifications and resultant sentences: The specification “that
barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves” seems
connotative, in that its component words, both severally and jointly in the order in which
they figure, are readily understood. And it seems connotative in that we can (at least
vaguely) envisage sundry procedures by which to locate the nominative terms’ putative
denotations and thus the denotation of the specification as a whole. (We look for barbers.
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We look to whom they shave. We query who among the latter shave themselves. Etc.)
But when we inquire of such a barber whether he shaves himself, it seems that if he does,
he does not, and that if he does not, he does. It thus seems problematical to say of any
sentence asserting that he does or doesn’t that it is determinately true or false. And it
therefore likewise seems problematical to assert that the specification, notwithstanding its
connotation, bears a denotation. (More on denotationlessness in its own right in the
following paragraph.) Similar remarks hold for sentences purporting to assert something
of Russell’s “class of all classes that are not members of themselves.”12 And related
examples abound. (The Cretan “liar,” “this sentence is false,” etc.) But “paradox” here
means more than simple contradiction. Drop the “not” from the second example and you
have “the class of all classes that are members of themselves.” Does that class belong to
itself? How would we ever find out? There seems to be no procedure, even in principle,
by which to determine an answer. Call the sentence “undecidable.” We might conclude
that such sentences are not syntactically well-formed after all. (And thus consign them to
the “nonsense” heap.) Or we might assign them a new semantic value.13
2. Missing term-referents more generally: Expressions such as “my mother’s
cousin,” “the largest prime,” or “the King of America” are connotative, in that their
component words both severally and jointly in the order that they figure are readily
understood. And they are connotative in that we generally can (at least vaguely) envisage
sundry procedures by which to locate the terms’ putative denotations and then predicate
additional descriptions of them. (One might learn that “my mother’s cousin,” for
example, once one has traced the relevant branches of the family tree, also describes a
well-known anthropologist, who now turns out to be my mother’s cousin.) But such
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expressions also, of course, notwithstanding their success in connoting, might fail to
denote. There is no king of America, however surprisingly this might strike some; and it
would seem as misleading either to affirm or deny any sentence formed by prefixing that
specification to a sentential predicate as it would be to affirm or deny that a gentle soul
had “stopped beating [her] spouse.”14 It would thus seem, at least for many purposes,
misleading to ascribe either truth or falsehood to such sentences.15
3. Vaguely determined predicate-extensions: The claim that “I got into a car” is
true if I have buckled myself into a sedan. It will generally be thought false if I have
buckled myself into a helicopter. But to claim either that it is true, or that it is false, if I
have buckled myself into a jeep, might in many contexts seem misleading. Likewise if I
have dived through the opened window of the vehicle and my legs remain, kicking,
outside. Such cases, as well as the better known Sorites puzzle and other “paradoxes of
induction,” might seem to call for many-valued or “fuzzy” logics, of which three-valued
logics are a special case.16
4. Bivalence-entailed objectionable metaphysical (or epistemic) commitments:
Statements of the form “two thousand years from now there will be a sea battle,”17 or “it
would have rained at Marathon had the clouds been seeded,” or “there is a greatest prime
number which, when two is subtracted from it, yields another prime number” might seem
to commit their utterers to metaphysical (or epistemological) views that are plausibly, if
not readily, to be rejected. For it to be determinately true or false now that a sea battle
will take place later, it might seem that there will have to be some feature of the world
now in virtue of which the statement is, presently, true or false.18 But that would seem to
imply that the future is now determined, and surely one may, perhaps even ought, reject
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determinism.19 A similar objection might beset counterfactual claims.20 And the claim
that it is determinately true or false that the twin prime problem will, or can in principle,
be solved might look similarly to entail metaphysical determinism, Platonism about
mathematical objects (and the knowledge thereof), or both.21 Those who reject such
doctrines might be tempted to reject the bivalence that seems to underwrite them, at least
with respect to the suspect classes of sentences.

3.2. Rawlsian Reasons for Rejecting Bivalence?
I can see no applicability, to a prospective Rawlsian rejection of bivalence, of the
argument from vagueness.22 I therefore provisionally dismiss that possibility for present
purposes. Rawls also does not appear able to reject bivalence by appeal – at least by
direct appeal – to the denotationlessness of any thus-far considered specifications or
singular terms. After all, the “terms” here – “primary goods,” “fulfillment of life plans,”
and the like – all are his own, and he surely purports to be writing about something.
But there is an indirect way in which Rawls might be taken to appeal implicitly to
the possible denotationlessness of terms or specifications: He can be taken to argue that
certain conceivable, salient, and indeed oft effectively encountered specifications would
or do lack referents. Thus, for example, Rawls might seem by dint of some of his
assertions concerning the “incommensurability of lifeplans” (or of the “conceptions of
the good” expressed in them)23 to be committed to the denotationlessness of some such
expression as “the ratio of my degree of lifeplan-satisfaction to yours.” Expressions such
as these might be readily analogized by Rawlsians to terms such as “7/0,” which fail to
denote because the operations by reference to which the terms are partly formed – “/” in
this case – are undefined over some domain an object of which – 0 in this case – also
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figures, by name, into the term’s formation. Ratio comparison over measures of separate
lifeplan-satisfaction might then be thought simply “undefined” as is division by zero,
even though the operations of ratio comparison and division (which seem indeed to
amount to a single arithmetical operation, the one simply a particular application of the
other) generally are defined over domains sufficiently broad as to grant them at least a
syntactically well-formed status even in those few cases in which they are semantically
undefined.
Yet this prospective Rawlsian argument from denotationlessness might seem a bit
ad hoc and unconvincing as it stands thus far. A simple case of fiat. (Interpersonal
comparisons are simply deemed undefined.) For if we can understand an expression such
as “the degree of lifeplan-satisfaction” (i.e., of one person’s such “degree”) and it refers
to something (something numerical), then why, and in what sense, can we not understand
a successfully referring “ratio-comparison of (two persons’) degrees [again, numerical
things] of lifeplan-satisfaction”? (Do we actually know, prior to calculation, that such
forthrightly numeric ratios stand on a less secure footing than the square-root of two?)
And if the (glib) reply is that we do not understand (an unreffering) “degree of lifeplansatisfaction,” but only the veritably referring “intrapersonal level of lifeplan-satisfaction,”
then the obvious rejoinder is, why can we not understand a successfully referring
“interpersonal ordinal comparison of levels of lifeplan-satisfaction”?24 A peremptory
Rawlsian brush-off of the form, say, “because life plans are incommensurable” clearly
would not do. For, leaving to one side for the moment the obscurity of the notion of
“incommensurable [even “mensurable”] lifeplans,”25 it is not lifeplans that we purport to
compare, only their degrees, or levels, of satisfaction – measures that Rawls seems to

15

believe exist (at least intrapersonally – recall premise (2)). And what is inherently
incomparable about such seemingly objective, numeric things as (cardinal) degrees and
(ordinal) levels?
Presumably, then, the Rawlsian would wish to argue against bivalence in matters
of lifeplan-satisfaction-level-comparison not so much from the mere possibility or ad hoc
stipulation of the unreferringness of terms or specifications alone, as from some
paradox(es) or objectionable metaphysical or epistemic commitment(s) entailed by the
very prospect of such terms’ referring. What might such paradoxes or commitments
be?26 And how are they to be avoided? The proofs that follow will occasion skepticism
as to whether any such means of avoidance that salvages either of premises (2) and (3) in
their present forms can be coherently articulated. Indeed, paradox is what seems to afflict
the supposition that it can. But I shall assume for the sake of argument – i.e., for the sake
of the proofs themselves – that something might be so articulated. And in Part 5 I shall
both a) speculate as to what leads Rawls (and Risse) astray both in supposing that there is
such an articulation and in seeking to accommodate it, and b) show that the only plausible
articulation requires a non-standard reinterpretation of both premises (2) and (3).

3.3. Implementing the Rejection of Bivalence
Three programmatic decisions attend the formulation of a logic that rejects
bivalence. (The reader is again asked to skip over or simply skim the current subpart if
well familiar with these preliminaries.) The first is not strictly necessary but generally
desirable if the logic is to be “useful” or “applicable,” i.e., if it is to reflect motivation by
anything beyond Hilbertian considerations: It is prospectively to interpret, and often thus
appropriately to name, in some intuitively appreciable sense, the added semantic value,

16

values or gaps that will figure into the new logic. This decision of course follows
directly, as a conceptual matter, upon considerations such as those just assayed with
respect to why bivalence might be rejected in the first instance. Thus, for example, if the
value designated “T” or “1” is to be taken to mean “true,” and “F” or “0” to mean “false,”
then one will wish to take the third value, say “I,” “U,” “N,” “1/2,” a blank space or suchlike to mean “indeterminate,” “unknown,” “unknowable,” “neither,” “both,” “inbetween,” “paradoxical,” or the like. The choice of prospective interpretation often will
guide – though of course it need not – the choice of valuational symbols themselves.
Those mindful of possibly meaningful sentences with metaphysically indeterminate truth
value might choose the valuation set {T, F, I}, “I” suggesting “indeterminate”; those
more mindful of epistemic limitations and consequent unknowability the set {T, F, U},
“U” suggesting “unknowable,” etc.27
The second programmatic decision is whether indeed to replace the standard,
bivalent logic with a three-valued logic, or with a “gapped” or “supervaluational,”
intuitionist or “epistemic,” modal or “contextual,” or some other non-truth-functional
logic. The choice between these options does not implicate any issue that need long
detain us here, particularly as I shall show that the proofs derivable in trivalent cases
carry over to the plausible alternatives. Essentially, the choice between trivalence and
some other plausible, non-truth-functional alternative reflects the “macro” choice
between a) retention of finite semantic matrices – hence, retention of truth-functional
semantics – at the cost of some lost classical tautologies (this is the three-value option);
b) retention of all classical tautologies at the expense of accepting an infinite matrix and
the consequent loss of truth-functionality (the supervaluational option); and c) sacrifice
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either of finitary truth-functional semantics, of the classical tautologies, of complete
axiomatizability, of interdefinable sentential connectives, or of some combination of
these in the interest of some other – generally either metaphysically or epistemologically
motivated – gain (the intuitionist or modal options). I shall say a bit more about these
trade-offs logic-by-logic infra, Part IV, as their relevances emerge.
The third and final programmatic decision arises essentially only for veritably
truth-functional, three-valued logics. It is to determine what effect valuation, with the
third value, of a sentential part of a more complex sentential whole will have upon that
whole. It is possible, for example, to take the complex proposition “∀ ∨ ∃,” when
assigned the values “T ∨ I,” either to be true – because one of its components is true and
this is all that is needed for the disjunctive whole to be true28 – or to be indeterminate –
perhaps because indeterminacy (or, more plausibly, “nonsensicality”) of some part of a
sentence ought for some reason to be taken to vitiate the whole.29 (“Green cheese yellow
or I am happy” is perhaps as nonsensical as “Green cheese yellow” notwithstanding the
sensicality of “I am happy.”) In effect, such choices can be read as assignments of
meanings to the sentential connectives – “and,” “or,” etc.30 Alternative ascriptions yield
alternative logics. I shall briefly characterize each such set of ascriptions in introducing
each of the standard three-valued logics below. What is more important for present
purposes is that Rawls’s three claims – propositions (1) through (3) above – turn out to be
jointly incompatible in all of them.

3.4. Proofs
In laying out the proofs I make use of two new formal devices additional to those
laid out in Part II. The first is a new sentential operator: For “∼” read an ascription of the
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third semantic value, how ever we construe it, to the sentence that follows the operator.
Hence “∼∀” will read “It is indeterminate whether [or “unknowable whether,” “neither
true nor false that,” etc.] ∀ is the case.”
The second device I use is the familiar semantic matrix.31 By means of such
tableaux I shall quickly characterize the meanings assigned by particular logics to the
familiar sentential connectives. (The reader is, one final time, asked to skip over or skim
the current paragraph if well familiar with this means of characterizing the sentential
connectives.) That is to say that a matrix will reveal, at a glance, the content of what I
just called the “third programmatic decision” implicit in each logic with respect to each
sentential connective. A simple three-valued matrix for the connective “≡”, for example,
might look like:
≡
1
.5
0

1
1
0
0

.5
0
1
0

0
0
0
1

This table shows that, in the logic in question, the operator “≡” veritably links two
simpler sentences – i.e., that the more complex sentence formed by the connective is
assigned a “1” – when and only when those simpler sentences are identically valued. The
operator in this case is of course effectively bivalent, even if the sentences that it connects
– which take values 0, .5, 1 – need not be. “Infection” of material equivalence by the
third value, that is, is minimal. A policy of “maximal infection” of complex sentences by
the third-valued parts would show itself in a modified matrix, namely, the preceding one
save with its center row and center column of cells all taking the value “.5”:
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≡ 1 .5 0
1 1 .5 0
.5 .5 .5 .5
0 0 .5 1
And an intermediately infective policy might be to modify the last by changing the center
value back to “1,” suggesting that indeterminates are indeterminately equivalent to
determinates, but determinately equivalent to one another:
≡ 1 .5 0
1 1 .5 0
.5 .5 1 .5
0 0 .5 1
Further such observations can await consideration of particular logics.
We derive the Roemerian contradiction from Rawls’s three premises in trivalent
logics as follows. First, recall the first two premises:
1) ∀x,y,i,j: x >o/i y ≡ x >o/j y.
2) ∀k: x >o/k y ⊃ x >s/k y.
Next, we must decide how to recast premise (3) in keeping with our hypothetical
Rawlsian rejection of bivalence. Two revisory candidates suggest themselves:
3’) ∼∀x,y,i,j: x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y.
3”) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ (x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y).
The first connotes, in effect, that it is indeterminate/unknowable/neither true nor false to
claim, etc., whether, for any two primary goods bundles and any two persons, one bundle
subjectively equals or exceeds the other bundle for one person if and only if it does so for
the other person. The second connotes, in effect, that for any two bundles and any two
persons, it is (affirmatively) indeterminate/unknowable/neither true nor false to claim,
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etc., whether one bundle subjectively equals or exceeds the other bundle for one person if
and only if it does so for the other person.
Candidate (3’) does not appear true to Rawlsian intentions. Rawls doesn’t seem
to hold that it is unknowable or indeterminate whether separate persons’ (“subjective”)
satisfactions are interpersonally ordinally equivalent. He seems rather to hold,
affirmatively, that those satisfactions definitely are not comparable, i.e., in the language
of trivalent semantics, that prospective comparisons, and thus ordinal equivalence, are
affirmatively, definitely, inavertibly, necessarily indeterminate, unknowable, etc.
Proposition (3”) therefore seems to be the more faithful rendering of the Rawlsian
intuition that we are exploring.
It is worth observing that we needn’t actually resolve this question in the threevalued case, however, at least not apart from questions of interpretation.32 For the only
expansion that I can envisage for (3’) in any three-valued logic will itself be included in –
it will be a proper part of – each of the expansions of (3”) warranted by those same
trivalent logics. I explain: The only expansion that seems to make sense of (3’) is:
4’) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ x >s/i y .∨. x >s/j y.
This comes of analogizing (3’) to (3) and making the “∼” in the former do the work of the
“¬” in the latter (relying, of course, on the classical equivalence of “∀ ⊃ ∃” and “¬∀ .∨.
∃”). But the two disjuncts of (4’) – call them “(4a’)” and “(4b’)” – we shall see, are
among the four disjuncts that figure into the expansion of (3”) in Łukasiewicz’s logic,
and among the five disjuncts that figure into the expansion of (3”) in Bočvar’s, Smiley’s,
Kleene’s and Woodruff’s logics. Since each disjunct is, in effect, a Rawlsian way out of
the inconsistency discovered by Roemer, to show that all (four or five) (3”) avenues are
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blocked is per force to show that all (both) (3’) avenues are blocked as well. On, now, to
those avenues:

3.4.1. Łukasiewicz
Łukasiewicz’s trivalent logic is motivated by a concern over the earlier mentioned
problematicity of future contingents (“there will be a sea battle …”).33 Because ascribing
a determinate truth-value to statements involving such contingents seemed to him to
entail an objectionable commitment to determinism, Łukasiewicz recommended
ascription of a third semantic value – “I,” for “indeterminate,” or “possible” – to them.
Łukasiewiczian negation of a true or false sentence accordingly yields a false or true
sentence as in classical, bivalent logic, but Łukasiewiczian negation of an indeterminate
sentence yields another indeterminate sentence. Łukasiewicz’s other logical operators
are semantically characterized as follows:
∧
T
I
F

T
T
I
F

I
I
I
F

F
F
F
F

∨
T
I
F

T
T
T
T

I
T
I
I

F
T
I
F

⊃
T
I
F

T
T
T
T

I
I
T
T

F
F
I
T

≡
T
I
F

T
T
I
F

I
I
T
I

F
F
I
T
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Now we can expand (3”) Łukasiewicz-style simply by inspecting the semantic matrix
associated with the Łukasiewiczian “≡” and determining which combinations of
valuational assignments to two “atomic” formulae yield an “indeterminate” valuation to
that “molecular” formula produced by connecting the two atomic formulae with the
Łukasiewiczian “≡”. Since any such combination is sufficient to confer the
“indeterminate” value upon a complex sentence involving the Łukasiewiczian “≡,” the
disjunction of all such combinations will be equivalent to the original “≡”-statement.
Treating “∼” prefixed to a formula “∀” as the syntactic indicator of semantic valuation
with the “indeterminate” value, “¬” of that with the “false” value, and “∀” standing
alone that of the “true” value, we see that (3”) accordingly is equivalent to:
4”) ∀x,y,i,j: x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y :∨: ∼ x >s/i y .∧. x >s/j y :∨: ∼ x >s/i y .∧. ¬ x >s/j y
:∨: ¬ x >s/i y .∧. ∼x >s/j y.
It will prove convenient to separate the component disjuncts of (4”). They are:
4a”) x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y.
4b”) ∼ x >s/i y .∧. x >s/j y.
4c”) ∼ x >s/i y .∧. ¬ x >s/j y.
4d”) ¬ x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y.
We can now derive the Roemer contradiction in the new, less restrictive logic. The
object is to show that each of (4a”) through (4d”) is inconsistent with some entailment of
premises (1) and (2). First, then, again let x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b, k = a, and k = b, as
we did in Part II, so that all of the salient assumptions and results posited and derived in
connection with premises (1) and (2) in that part carry over to the present part. In
particular, then, we have (again),
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4) let x = m, y = n, k = a,
6) let k = b,
8) let i = a, and j = b,
12) m >s/b n.
And from Part II’s (5), (10), and implication-elimination we have the previously
underived:
22) m >s/a n.
These results hold independently of any consequences we derive from (4a”) through
(4d”). Now we derive some of those consequences. From (4), (4a”) and (8), we have
23) m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
This and conjunction-elimination yield:
24) ∼ m >s/b n,
which (softly) contradicts (12).34 From (4), (4c”), and (8), we have:
25) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n.
This and conjunction-elimination yield:
26) ¬ m >s/b n,
which (firmly) contradicts (12). From (4), (4d”), and (8), we have:
27) ¬ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
This and conjunction-elimination yield:
28) ∼ m >s/b n,
which is the same result as (24), which as we noted before (softly) contradicts (12). Now
note that (4), (4b”) and (8) yield:
29) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n.

24

This and conjunction-elimination yield:
30) ∼ m >s/a n,
which (softly) contradicts (22).
We see, then, that in the Łukasiewicz system all four routes by which (4”), hence
by which (3”), might avoid conflict with (1) and (2) are closed. The (revised) Rawlsian
premises fare no better in our remaining trivalent logics.

3.4.2. Bočvar, Smiley
Bočvar’s and Smiley’s third semantic value is designated, like Łukasiewicz’s, “I.”
In Bočvar’s case, however, the intended reading of “I” is “paradoxical,” or “senseless.”35
His concern is with properly valuing “barber,” Russellian set, Cretan liar and like
paradoxes as discussed in III.A. Smiley’s “I” reads “undefined” or “truth-valueless,” and
is prompted by concern over sentences containing non-denoting terms, functions
undefined over certain arguments, and the like – again as discussed earlier.36 (Smiley’s
logic might therefore seem a natural vehicle through which to formalize a set of Rawlsian
premises predicated on some form of incommensurability.) Again, as with Łukasiewicz,
negation of a truth or falsehood yields a falsehood or truth, that of a “paradoxical,”
“meaningless,” “undefined” or “truth-valueless” sentence another of the same semantic
type. The other connectives are semantically characterized as follows:
∧
T
I
F

T
T
I
F

I
I
I
I

F
F
I
F
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∨
T
I
F

T
T
I
T

I
I
I
I

F
T
I
F

⊃ T
T T
I I
F T

I
I
I
I

F
F
I
T

≡
T
I
F

I
I
I
I

F
F
I
T

T
T
I
F

Bočvar and Smiley also make use of an “assertion” operator (Smiley characterizes
his as an “it is true that …” operator) which yields a truth when prefixed to a truth, a
falsehood when prefixed to a falsehood or to a “paradoxical,” “senseless,” “truthvalueless” or other such third-valued statement. Bivalence is thus restored at a secondorder level, and a set of “external” connectives, each of them a counterpart to one of the
just-characterized “internal” connectives, is defined on that basis. (Hence, a “” prefixed
to a truth yields a falsehood, and to an indeterminate or false sentence a truth; an “&”
yields a truth when connecting two truths, a falsehood otherwise; etc.) We need not
dwell upon these “metasentential” matters, however, because any contradiction derivable
in a “weaker,” three-valued logic of the “first order” can be expected likewise to turn up
(in “firm” form) in the “stronger,” two-valued logic of the “second order” just as it does
in the case of a bivalent first-order logic.
Roemer’s contradiction is again readily derivable in the Bočvar/Smiley logic.
First, inspection of the semantic matrix for the Bočvar/Smiley “≡” reveals that (3”) will
again entail the above disjunction (4”) of the four disjuncts (4a”) through (4d”), but now
also will entail a fifth:
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4e”) ∼ x >s/i y .∧. ∼ x >s/j y.
This formula disjoined with (4a”) through (4d”) will yield a new (4”) – call it “(5”)” –
materially equivalent to (3”) in the new logic. Since we have just shown the hypothetical
Rawlsian “ways out” represented by (4a”) through (4d”) to be blocked, all that remains to
show a Rawlsian escape from Roemer’s contradiction foreclosed in the Bočvar/Smiley
logic is to show that (4e”), too, is blocked. But this is readily done: By (4), (4e”), and
(8), we have:
31) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
This and conjunction-elimination yield both:
32) ∼ m >s/a n,
which is our earlier-derived (30), and
33) ∼ m >s/b n,
which is our earlier-derived (24) (and 28)) again. But (32) (softly) contradicts (22), while
(33) (softly) contradicts (12). So (4e”) is (“twice-softly”) foreclosed, and (3”) thus once
again fails to cohere with (1) and (2) in a (now more permissive) trivalent logic. Only
two standard logics of that latter sort remain for Rawlsians to attempt.

3.4.3. Kleene, Woodruff
Kleene’s concern is with indefinite partial recursive functions (relations in
particular) and undecidable propositions à la Church and Gödel.37 His third semantic
value – “U” – is accordingly to be read “undetermined,” “indefinite,” or “undecidable
whether true or false.” (My earlier-mentioned question as to the self-membership of the
“set of all sets that are self-members” comes to mind.) Woodruff’s “U” is to be read
“undefined,” or “truth-valueless,” and is prompted by the same concerns as prompted
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Smiley’s logic – viz., missing term-referents.38 Again, negation of a true or false
sentence yields a false or true sentence, of an “undecidable,” “undefined” or “truthvalueless” sentence another of the same semantic type. The other sentential operators are
semantically characterized as follows:
∧ T U F
T T U F
U U U F
F F F F
∨
T
U
F

T U F
T T T
T U U
T U F

⊃
T
U
F

T U F
T U F
T U U
T T T

≡ T U F
T T U F
U U U U
F F U T
In Kleene’s case, the tables just provided characterize what he calls “strong”
connectives. Kleene’s “weak” connectives are as Bočvar’s previously tabulated
“internal,” and Smiley’s “primary,” connectives. (Kleene is thus thoroughgoingly – as it
were “twice” – trivalent.) Woodruff for his part takes the connectives as just
characterized for “weak” or “internal” connectives à la Bočvar and Smiley, then provides
“stronger” bivalent valuations as do the latter two logicians for sentences prefixed with
an assertion operator which he symbolizes “T.” Woodruff also makes use of several
additional operators which further strengthen his second-order sentences but need not
detain us here.
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Fixing attention on the matrix for “≡” in particular, we see that it is isomorphic to
Bočvar’s and Smiley’s. Accordingly, the Rawlsian premise (3”) will again, in the
Kleene/Woodruff system, be equivalent to the five-termed disjunction we described and
named “(5”)” above, and which we found to be inconsistent with (1) and (2). Roemer’s
contradiction accordingly turns up in the (first order of) the Kleene/Woodruff logic in
precisely the way that it does in the Bočvar/Smiley logic.
There remains one avenue to try. How might a Rawlsian fare at the Kleenean
“second order,” with Kleene’s “weak” connectives, after having come (“softly”) a
cropper with the “strong” ones? That is, what value will the Kleenean “weak”
connectives assign to the derived contradictions themselves? To answer this query, we
simply conjoin the derived mutually contradictory formulae and assign those
conjunctions semantic values pursuant to the Kleenean “weak” connective matrices,
which as we noted are those that Bočvar and Smiley provide respectively for their
“internal” and “primary” connectives. The contradictions are:
C1): (24) & (12);
C2): (26) & (12);
C3): (27) & (12);
C4): (29) & (22);
C5): (32) & (22);
C6): (33) & (12).
Owing to the equivalence of (24), (28) and (33), and of (30) and (32), these six
contradictions reduce to (C1), (C2), and (C4). Spelled out, they are:
C1) ∼ m >s/b n .∧. m >s/b n;
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C2) ¬ m >s/b n .∧. m >s/b n;
C4) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/a n.
Assigning semantic values to each conjunct pursuant to the aforementioned scheme
whereby the “¬” falsifies a formula, the “∼” “indeterminates” it and the absence of any
prefix amounts to asserting the truth of the formula, and then valuing the conjunctions
themselves pursuant to the rules characterizing use of the Bočvar/Smiley “∧,” we arrive
at:
C1) I ∧ T = I;
C2) F ∧ T = F;
C4) I ∧ T = I.
Since no “T”’s appear, we have no way out. There is in the case of each disjunct of (5”)
either a hard or a soft contradiction ((C1) and (C4) are soft, (C2) hard), and so Rawls fails
via premises (1) through (3) to speak univocally even in the most permissive of trivalent
logics, Kleene’s.

4. Briefly on Some Other Logics
While three- (and other many-) valued logics are the most frequently encountered
means by which formally to accommodate the objections to classical logic discussed at
3.1, and to examine the implications of doing so, they are not the only such means. In
this part I briefly consider three other alternative logics that might be thought plausible
means of salvaging Rawls’s treatment of primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction. And I
indicate how the proofs derived in the previous section carry-over into these alternatives.

4.1. Supervaluation
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So-called “supervaluational” logic is an alternative means of accommodating the
concerns that motivate many-valued logics without actually positing a “third,” or “nth,”
semantic value.39 Rather than an “I,” a “U” or a “1/2,” say, in the standard semantic
tableaux, suspect formulae receive a “gap” or blank cell – that is, no semantic valuation
at all. As a formal matter, this does not come to quite the same thing as a valuation with
the “third” or “nth” value, a gap simply amounting to a third or nth symbol. For
supervaluation also involves a critical second operational stage following the initial
assignment of semantic values and gaps.
In that second stage, all constitutive “atomic” propositional formulae of a longer,
“molecular” formula, what ever their de dicto or de facto valuations (or non-valuations)
in the first stage – “T” or “1,” “F” or “0,” or blank – are hypothetically assigned,
ensemble, all possible classical valuational combinations – that is, all possible
combinations of “T”’s and “F”’s or “1”’s and “0”’s; and any complex formula which
ends with a unique invariant valuation through all such combinations is supervaluated
with that semantic value. By this means all classical tautologies (and, by parity, all
classical contradictions, which are simply negated tautologies) derivable in the standard
bivalent logic are preserved in the new logic.
The price, of course, is loss of truth-functionality – and consequent loss of the
usability of finite matrices in semantic analysis – on the part of complex formulae. That
is, the semantic value of a complex, “molecular” formula no longer is mechanically
derivable from the semantic valuations of its constitutive “atomic” formulae. For while a
formula such as “∀ ∨ ¬∀” would receive a supervaluation of “T” no matter what value
were assigned “∀” in the first and second stages, and thus amount to a supervaluational
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tautology, a formula such as “∀ ∨ ∃” would not; either of ∀’s or ∃’s being semantically
gapped (i.e., truth-valueless, semantically empty) at the first stage would result in its –
and the disjunction’s – remaining gapped at the end of the second stage. That is, “∀ ∨
∃,” unlike “∀ ∨ ¬∀,” would be neither valuated nor supervaluated, for “∀ ∨ ∃,” unlike
“∀ ∨ ¬∀,” is not a classical tautology or contradiction. In a many-valued logic, by
contrast, both of these formulae would be valuated, and the semantics of the connective
“∨” thus fully truth-functional; but the tautological status of “∀ ∨ ¬∀” might be lost, as
inspection of the matrices for “∨” laid out in III.D for all trivalent logics we have
considered readily demonstrates.
In light of the foregoing, it should be clear that supervaluational logic offers no help
to Rawlsians in avoiding the Roemer contradiction. Supervaluations differ from trivalent
logics only in their preservation of classical tautologies in (“second stage”) semantic
analysis. Motivated by the same philosophical concerns as those logics, they do not
independently affect the syntax of those logics or the application of those logics to
particular problems. We can see this perhaps most directly simply by systematically
reinterpreting the tilde throughout the derivations carried out in Part 3.4. Rather than
reading it as ascribing the third semantic value to the sentence following it, read it as
ascribing a semantically gapped status to the same. The “hard” and “soft” contradictions
derived in 3.4 are formally unaffected.

4.2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionist logic is prompted by concern to avoid certain objectionable metaphysical
commitments of the sort discussed at Part 3.1 – or, perhaps, their epistemic
counterparts.40 At the outset, that concern which most troubled intuitionists was classical
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mathematics’ – and its associated classical logic’s – apparent commitment to Platonism
and/or some epistemic analogue to Platonism. Classical mathematicians and logicians,
intuitionists believed, had misunderstood the nature of mathematic activity. The latter,
by intuitionist lights, was not the exploration of an independent realm to which mental
access was incomplete, but the active construction of mental objects pursuant to certain
“principles of thought” bearing a distinctly Kantian coloration.
The intuitionist reinterpretation of mathematics lends itself to a reinterpretation of
classical semantics, whereby “truth” comes to mean, more or less, “provability” or
“consructability,” while “falsity” comes to mean something like “provability-not” or
“nonconstructability” – the latter determined by the derivability of a (firm) contradiction
from the assumption that a particular statement or object is in fact provable or
constructible. This in turn lends itself to a reinterpretation of classical syntax, in which
certain classical laws – notably tertium non datur – no longer hold and in which many
classical theorems accordingly are no longer derivable, the classical sentential operators
therefore effectively redefined. (The negation operator, for example, seems no longer
simply to deny or contradict, but affirmatively to assert contrariness – i.e., to amount not
to mere “reversal” of the truth-value of the proposition to which it is prefixed, but to
independently warranted assertion that the proposition is affirmatively contraindicated.41
The classical tautology “¬¬∀ ⊃ ∀” is thus lost, the rule of negation-elimination
effectively relinquished. As are many others.)
Intuitionist principles have been extended to non-mathematical discourse by so-called
“antirealists,” as well as, to a somewhat lesser extent, by certain “internal realists” and
“irrealists,” who note analogies between the intuitionist view of mathematics on the one
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hand and what it is to learn, understand and use any language on the other.42 Because to
learn the meaning of and understand an indicative sentence is to learn and understand the
conditions under which it is assertible, they reason, and because the conditions under
which the familiar word “truth” is ascribable to such a sentence are themselves just those
under which the sentence is assertible, the learning, use, and meaningfulness of language
itself – which, after all, includes among its terms the learned word “truth” – amount to
grist for a manner of Kantian “transcendental argument” to the effect that truth is none
but assertibility.43 And since assertability is in effect a generalization of the notion of
mathematical constructability, antirealists hold that the same logic advocated by
intuitionists in the latter context ought to be applied – now, in some cases, under the
name “epistemic logic” – in other linguistic contexts as well. That is, intuitionist logic is,
as a consequence of the workings of language, language-acquisition, languageunderstanding and thus language-meaning themselves, the appropriate logic. And its
metaphysical and epistemic commitments (or non-commitments) constitute the
appropriate metaphysical and epistemic stance. Not only future contingents and
counterfactuals, but even certain statements about the past – if there be no way in
principle to ascertain their truth or falsity – might then be thought to be of indeterminate
truth value.44
The intuitionist denial of tertium non datur, and the conceptual tie between nonascertainability of truth-value (what we might, in honor of the neo-intuitionist antirealists,
call “antireality”), on the one hand, and indeterminacy or unknowability on the other,
suggest that intuitionist logic might amount to yet another means by which to formalize
the Rawlsian premises (1) through (3) in conformity to Rawlsian intuitions regarding
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commensurability. And indeed, we can readily carry out this formalization. The trouble
for Rawlsians is that it does not help. Here is why:
Let us reinterpret the tilde utilized in Part 3.4 as an ascription, per intuitionist
principles, of the non-ascertainability of the truth-value of the proposition which follows
it. Since the first two Rawlsian premises do not involve that operator, they do not
implicate any logical rules peculiar to, or applications objectionable to, intuitionist logic,
and all results derived from them in Parts 2 and 3 carry over to this Part. The third
Rawlsian premise, which does involve the tilde, would again then be formalized by the
string that we labeled “(3”),” but would simply bear a (marginally) different intuitive
meaning. Call that intuitionist rendition of the third Rawlsian premise “(3I)”:
3I) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ (x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y).
Unpacking (3I) pursuant to the standard Heyting intuitionist axiomatics,45 we derive:
4I) ∀x,y,i,j: ∼ (x >s/i y ⊃ x >s/j y) .∨. ∼ (x >s/j y ⊃ x >s/i y).
Appealing once more to universal-elimination and setting x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b, we
have:
5I) ∼ (m >s/a n ⊃ m >s/b n) .∨. ∼ (m >s/b n ⊃ m >s/a n).
This formula and the intuitionist interpretation of implication in terms of disjunction and
unascertainability yield:
6I) m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n :∨: ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n.
But now note that the first disjunct of this formula is in essence just that which we
labeled “(4a”)” in the cases of those trivalent logics utilized in Part 3.4. And the second
disjunct is just that which we labeled “(4b”)” in the same. Both of these disjuncts, we
saw, at least softly contradicted some formula derived from the first two Rawlsian
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premises. It appears, then, that intuitionist logic – which vis a vis Rawls amounts to a
strengthening of the logics considered in Part III (because it offers only two, rather than
four (Łukasiewicz), five (Bočvar, Smiley, Woodruff), or six (Kleene) prima facie “ways
out”) – offers no escape from Roemer’s contradiction.

4.3. Modal Logic
There are conceptual affinities among certain terms-of-art used by advocates of
trivalent and intuitionist logics on the one hand, certain common “modal” expressions on
the other. Thus Łukasiewicz, in semantically characterizing those future-contingent (“sea
battle”) statements which he thought incapable of truth or falsity, sometimes used the
word “possible.” (He also objected to the ascription of determinate truth values to such
statements because he believed that to be determinately true or false they would have to
be “necessarily” so.46) And intuitionists, who generally have spoken in terms of
“provability” and “provability-not” or “constructability” and “non-constructability,”
sometimes in parallel fashion use such terms as “possibility” and “impossibility.” (A
“constructible” object is, of course, an object that it is possible to construct.) The
question thus arises whether some rationale that might render a trivalent or intuitionist
logic attractive to a Rawlsian might also lend some attraction to a modal logic, and
whether such a logic might offer Rawls a way out of the Roemer contradiction.
I think that we can dismiss this prospect for two reasons, one interpretive, the other
formal. The interpretive problem is that it is difficult to envisage much sense that might
attach to a reading of the Rawlsian premises along modal lines that hasn’t already been
assayed in formalizing them trivalently, supervaluationally, or intuitionistically. Is the
modal reading of (3) that it is “merely possible” that degrees or levels of lifeplan-
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satisfaction be interpersonally ordinally equivalent? Is it that it is “impossible” that they
be so? Or is it that it is impossible to know? What difference between any of these
readings and the earlier-considered reinterpretations of (3) might we expect a modal logic
possessed of the necessity operator “□” and the possibility operator “◊” to capture while
the earlier-considered logics did not? The last possibility – the epistemic (“impossible to
know”) – seems to be the only one with any potential Rawlsian intuitive traction, yet this
“epistemic” understanding already has been captured by the intuitionist logic.47
The formal problem tracks the interpretive problem. For, as we might expect in view
of the conceptual ties between intuitionist “-abilities” and epistemics on the one hand, the
modal notions of possibility and contextuality on the other, it happens that the standard
modal logic, S4, is formally isomorphic to the standard Heyting intuitionist logic.48 That
is, it has been metalogically proved that any well-formed formula is valid in Heyting
logic if and only if its translation is valid in S4.49 (It has also been proved, not
surprisingly, that standard modal logics, like intuitionist and supervaluational logics, lack
finite characteristic semantic matrices.50) There thus seems to be little hope of salvaging
all three Rawlsian premises through reformalization in either classical or any plausible –
trivalent, supervaluational, intuitionist or modal – non-classical logic. Must we, then,
abandon one of the premises, or might we reformulate more than one of them?

5. A Plausible – and Intuitively Attractive – Way Out
I wish to close with a suggestion as to how best to salvage Rawls’s treatment of
primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction in a manner that is faithful to the Rawlsian
intuition of epistemically, politically, or politico-epistemically necessitated interpersonal
subjective incomparability. (I do not here endorse that intuition, I only suggest how to
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carry it out more satisfactorily.) Perhaps the problem captured by Rawls’s intuition stems
not from its comparability aspect, but from its subjectivity aspect – i.e., not from
interpersonal comparison as such, but from would-be reliably observable, somehow
measurable, and politically cognizable private or subjective magnitudes more generally.
It is difficult, when one pauses to reflect upon the problem, to imagine just what sort of
actual observation, measurement or moral-political problem not endemic to subjective
phenomena tout court would be (uniquely) endemic to interpersonal comparisons of
subjective phenomena. Is the Rawlsian idea that there is some irreducible something that
is not sufficiently “public,” “political,” observable or detachable from the person to allow
for comparison of its “possession” or “attainment” by or quantitative attributability to
separate persons, but that is, somehow, sufficiently well-understood, isolable, public and
legitimately politically salient nonetheless to allow for such attributability to individual
persons at different times?51 Would such an idea be practically or operationally
coherent? Its seeming near-inarticulability (as distinct from its formalizability) affords
some grounds for skepticism, as do the formal results derived throughout this paper. I
want to suggest that the idea is not coherent, and that focusing upon would-be detachable,
reliably observable and measurable subjective magnitudes as culprit offers a means of
recasting the Rawlsian premises in a manner that is both intuitively intelligible and
formally consistent.
I think that the real Rawlsian intuition is that (“subjective”) lifeplan-satisfaction in
some epistemic and/or normative-political manner defies, or at least somehow challenges,
(even ordinal) quantification. That intuition apparently engages, in Rawls’s case, at the
point where satisfactions between persons would be compared. But all, if anything, that
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renders such comparison pragmatically or politically problematic, it would seem upon
reflection, is the difficulty likely to attend any interesting form of satisfactionquantification. It is the operational intractability, and/or perhaps the normative political
irrelevance or inadmissibility, of consistently reliable observation, consideration, and
measurement of ineluctably “private” or “subjective” phenomena.52
I have in mind here three specific possibilities, any combination of which, I believe,
might appeal to Rawlsian concerns associated with a “political not metaphysical”
conception of justice. First, the public inaccessibility of such privately privileged
information as lifeplan-satisfaction assimilates it to mystical revelations and related
phenomena associated with “comprehensive doctrines,” phenomena that Rawlsians
believe do not belong in “the public sphere” or behind the “veil of ignorance.” Second
and relatedly, the inescapable “vagueness” or “imprecision” of quantification in regard to
such phenomena also renders them impracticable distribuenda for purposes of
implementable, political justice. Finally, even were such epistemic and operational
constraints not applicable, the familiar liberal conferral of “consumer sovereignty” and
cognate statuses upon its subjects – treating each person as the sole authority as to the
degree to which her lifeplan or desires are satisfied – presumably would bracket such
information from public cognizance notwithstanding any hypothetical accessibility. So
both the “public” (“objective”) and “private” (“subjective”) sides of what we might call
Rawls’s “wall of separation” would give reason to treat, and formalize, private matters
differently than public in the realm of politics.
Now of course there are sundry strategies, increasingly common since the turn of the
last century, by which to attempt to get round the strictly epistemic aspect of the problem
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– there are proposed incomplete (Paretian) social orderings, ordinal individual utilities
ascribed on the basis of persons’ revealed preferences among goods vectors, “extended
sympathies” from such preferences to the welfare of others, identification of “happiness”
with theoretically measurable physical correlates such as C-fibres or endorphins, etc. –
but none of these would seem in any practically appreciable way to validate Rawls’s
second premise without calling into question his third (which, recall, denies even ordinal
comparability of separate persons’ lifeplan-satisfactions). And, of course, it is perfectly
possible in a strictly conceptual, non-operational sense to distinguish, formally, between
intrapersonal and interpersonal measurement: There are, after all, those two formal
premises themselves (premises (2) and (3)). And there are well-known information- (or
group-) theoretic means by which to give mathematical expression, and precision, to the
idea that interpersonal comparison is one thing, intertemporal intrapersonal comparison
another.53 But none of these strategies, how ever successful, would touch the “consumer
sovereignty” or “liberal” aspect of Rawlsian political justice. And again the point here is,
in any event, that it is difficult, as an empirical, operational or even as a political-theoretic
matter, to discern what fact or facts about satisfaction or subjectivity would render it the
case that satisfaction is or ought to be treated as, e.g., intrapersonally cardinally
measurable but not interpersonally comparable, or intrapersonally but ordinally
measurable yet interpersonally fully comparable.54 Not all formally representable
conceptual distinctions are epistemically, practically or political-theoretically significant
– or even sustainable – distinctions. So perhaps what a Rawlsian (or indeed any similarly
oriented “political, not metaphysical” theorist of justice) ought to do, in order to retain
both formal consistency and politico-pragmatic intelligibility, is either to abandon that
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third premise altogether, or, more plausibly, to recast the second premise along with the
third.55
A reformulation of Rawls’s second premise in a manner consistent with the only
rationale that might warrant his third – viz., an alleged politico-epistemic problematicity,
perhaps a full-blown indeterminacy or unknowability, afflicting any quantitative or quasiquantitative claim (cardinal or ordinal) concerning such “private” or “subjective”
phenomena as satisfactions – might look like this:
2”) ∀x,y,k: ∼ (x >o/k y ⊃ x >s/k y).
Appealing to our earlier applications of universal-elimination and preserving their
results, we have (again):
4) let x = m, y = n, k = a,
and:
6) let k = b.
These in conjunction with (2”) yield:
2a”) ∼ (m >o/a n ⊃ m >s/a n);
and:
2b”) ∼ (m >o/b y ⊃ m >s/b n).
Unpacking these propositions via the semantic tableaux method employed in Part 3.4, we
find that in the Łukasiewicz logic (2a”) is equivalent to:
3a”) m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n :∨: ∼ m >o/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/a n,
while (2b”) is equivalent to:
3b”) m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n :∨: ∼ m >o/b n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n.
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Parsing-out all four disjuncts, each of which represents a Rawlsian way out, as we did in
connection with the proposition (4”) in Part 3, we have:
3a1”) m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n.
3a2”) ∼ m >o/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/a n.
3b1”) m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
3b2”) ∼ m >o/b n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n.
Unpacking (2a”) pursuant to the Kleene and Woodruff logics simply adds another
disjunct, i.e., another possible Rawlsian way out. Let us call it:
3a3”) ∼ m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n.
Unpacking (2b”) in the same way yields the analogue:
3b3”) ∼ m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
Unpacking (2a”) pursuant to the Bočvar/Smiley logic affords two more disjuncts, two
more Rawlsian ways out. They are:
3a4”) ∼ m >o/a n .∧. m >s/a n;
and:
3a5”) ¬ m >o/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/a n.
The analogues in the case of (2b”) are:
3b4”) ∼ m >o/b n .∧. m >s/b n;
and:
3b5”) ¬ m >o/b n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
It is perhaps worth noting in passing that the first three and the fifth “a” disjuncts
contradict the original Rawlsian premises (1) and (3) via our earlier derived (20), while
the fourth “a” disjunct contradicts those original Rawlsian propositions via our earlier
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derived (22). Parallel reasoning would show the same to hold true of the “b” disjuncts.
We cannot avoid Rawlsian inconsistency, then, by revising premise (2) alone. Can we
avoid inconsistency by revising both (2) and (3) pursuant to the revision of (3) proposed
in Part 3 – (3”) – and to that of (2) proposed here – (2”)? Indeed we can.
While a full-blown metalogical proof of the joint consistency of (1), (2”) and (3”)
might be marginally more reassuring, it should suffice here to argue intuitively. First, as
a general matter, note that all of the difficulties that Rawls encountered in Parts 2 and 3
decisively involved (2). That is, on each occasion that some entailment of (3) or (3”)
contradicted some other derived formula, that other derived formula required (2) as one
of its premises. A suitable revision of (2), this suggests, might well be compatible with
(3”), even though we have observed in the previous paragraph that it would not be
compatible with (3).
Next, to move to particulars, note that each disjunct of (4”) and (5”) discussed in
Part III represented a prospective Rawlsian way out of the Roemer contradiction, a route
that turned out to be closed by some entailment of (2). But since our new (2) – (2”) –
now also turns out to be disjunctive, it too offers a number of prospective Rawlsian ways
out – two such in the Łukasiewiczian logic, three such (which properly include the
Łukasiewiczian two) in the Kleene/Woodruff logic, and five such (which properly
include the Kleene/Woodruffian three) in the Bočvar/Smiley logic. If either of the two
(2”) ways out are compatible with any of the four (3”) ways out in the Łukasiewiczian
logic, then there is a Rawlsian way out in that logic once the original premises (2) and (3)
have been revised to (2”) and (3”). And since all of those ways out constitute proper
subsets of the (more inclusive) sets of prospective ways out offered by the other, more
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permissive trivalent logics, to show that (revised) Rawls passes through Łukasiewicz will
be to show that he passes through any standard trivalent (or equally permissive, e.g.
supervaluational, intuitionist or S4 modal) logic as well.
Let us recall those earlier four prospective Rawlsian “ways out” via the
Łukasiewiczian logic considered in Part 3.4, but let us fill in their free variables pursuant
to (4) and (8) – which set x = m, y = n, i = a, j = b. Suitably filled, the prospective “ways
out” are:
4a”) m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
4b”) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. m >s/b n.
4c”) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ¬ m >s/b n.
4d”) ¬ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n.
Now note that (3a1”), above, conflicts with (4a”) and (4d”), but is compatible with (4b”)
and (4c”). Either of the latter two, conjoined with (3a1”), constitutes not just a
prospective, but indeed a veritable Rawlsian way out of the Roemer contradiction. Next
note that (3a2”), above, conflicts with (4a”), (4b”), and (4c”), but is compatible with
(4d”): Another Rawlsian way out. Now note that (3b1”), above, conflicts with (4b”) and
(4c”), but is compatible with (4a”) and (4d”), while (3b2”) conflicts with (4a”), (4b”) and
(4d”), but is compatible with (4c”). Whether, pursuant to (2”), we set k = a or k = b,
then, we have three veritable Rawlsian-Łukasiewiczian ways out of the Roemer
contradiction. It follows that we have at least three ways out in any other alternative
logic thus far discussed as well, for the Łukasiewiczian is the most restrictive of them.
For the sake of completeness, however, we may as well take passing note of the
other possible routes offered by the other trivalent logics: Note, then, that (3a3”) is
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compatible with (4b”) and (4c”), though not with (4a”) and (4d”), while (3b3”) is
compatible with the latter two but not with the former two. Whether k = a or k = b, then,
the Kleene/Woodruff logic offers two additional Rawlsian routes of escape from the
Roemer inconsistency. That’s five ways out and still counting. Recalling that Kleene
and Woodruff (along with Bočvar and Smiley) allowed for a fifth disjunct in connection
with (4”), viz. (suitably filled like (4a”) through (4d”)),
4e”) ∼ m >s/a n .∧. ∼ m >s/b n,
we note that yet another prospective Rawlsian way out in connection with (3”) is
compatible with the following prospective Rawlsian ways out in connection with (2”):
(3a1”) and (3a3”); parallel remarks hold for the (3b”)’s. Seven ways out and still
counting.
Finally, note that (3a4”) is compatible with (4a”) but not with (4b”) through (4e”),
while (3a5”) is compatible with (4b”), (4c”) and (4e”) but not the others. Parallel
remarks holding for (3b4”) and (3b5”), we find that there are four more Rawlsian ways
out offered by the Bočvar/Smiley logic. That’s eleven ways out in total, for k = a or k =
b. One begins to suspect that, with our revised Rawlsian second premise – (2”) – we
might even move to use of the full equivalence (biconditional) operator “≡” from the
mere entailment (uniconditional) operator “⊃” and still preserve consistency, even
though this constitutes something of a strengthening (within the greater weakening
presented by the move to trivalence) of the relation that Rawls posits between primary
goods and lifeplan-satisfaction. (Indeed, since in the Bočvar/Smiley logic “I”’s are
assigned to exactly the same valuational combinations under “≡” as they are under “⊃”,
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we know that we can move to full material equivalence in that case without sacrificing
consistency.)
It might be well to interpret a few samples from among these “Rawlsian ways
out” pursuant to the neo-Rawlsian intuition underwriting the revised versions (2”) and
(3”) of premises (2) and (3). First consider the complete set of premises themselves.
Premise (1) still holds that primary good indices are “objectively” interpersonally
ordinally equivalent – that is, that one bundle “objectively” equals or exceeds another for
me if and only if it does so for you. Premise (2”) in turn holds that primary goods indices
and degrees or levels of lifeplan-satisfaction are in some sense “indeterminately,” or “not
fully knowably,” or “not legitimately politically-cognizably,” “‘objectively’/
‘subjectively’ intrapersonally quasi-ordinally related” – that is, perhaps, that one bundle’s
“objectively” equaling or exceeding another bundle for me generally can be expected to,
but cannot or should not (for purposes of a political conception of justice) fully
knowably, result in its yielding equal or greater “private” or “subjective” lifeplansatisfaction to me. (The relation is one of uniconditional implication as we have
interpreted it, though as suggested in the previous paragraph the weakening posed by the
move to trivalence will allow us to preserve consistency even if we “strengthen” the “not
fully knowable” relation to full ordinal equivalence.) Premise (3”) holds that degrees or
levels of lifeplan-satisfaction yielded by primary goods are in some sense
“indeterminately,” “not fully knowably,” or “not legitimately politically-congnizably,”
“‘subjectively’ interpersonally ordinally equivalent” – that is, perhaps, that one primary
goods bundle’s yielding equal or greater “private” or “subjective” lifeplan-satisfaction
than another to me generally will, but again cannot or should not (for purposes of a
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political conception of justice) be thought fully knowably, jointly to entail its doing the
same for you.
What fuller sense are we to make of these three claims respecting primary goods
and lifeplan-satisfaction? I propose the following: We know that primary goods are
“objective” things exterior to the person and open to reliable public inspection, and that
they therefore present no insuperable epistemic or political difficulties in principle as
regards verifiable and politically cognizable observation and measurement; your and my
holding the same bundle amounts, reliably and cognizably, to your and my holding the
same “amount,” at least in an ordinal if not in a cardinal sense (premise (1)).56 We also
know that it is reasonable to suppose (or, as Rawls does, definitionally to stipulate) that
more of these goods are better (more lifeplan-satisfying) than less in view of their
usefulness in the pursuit of lifeplans – they are, from the point of view of lifeplansatisfaction, “normal” goods – but, owing to difficulties attending the would-be
consistently reliable observation and (cardinal or even ordinal) measurement of such
“subjective” imponderables as lifeplan-satisfactions, in addition to the “publicity
constraint”57 placed by a political conception of justice upon the legitimate cognizability
of ineluctably “private” or “subjective” imponderables, we cannot and need not ever act
as though we knew with full confidence that more primary goods in all cases
determinately succeed, ceteris paribus, in bringing about more lifeplan-satisfaction; it is
only a reasonable supposition or “working hypothesis” – a matter of “common sense” or
“background knowledge” behind the veil of ignorance, perhaps – in characterizing and
implementing justice, which latter tasks include selecting an appropriate distribuendum
(premise (2”)). Finally, we know it also reasonable to suppose, in view of primary
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goods’ multiple uses, instrumental fungibility (Rawls calls them “all-purpose means”58)
and “normality” from the point of view of lifeplan-satisfaction, as well as in view of their
“objective” invariance in interpersonal holdings (premise (1)), that there will be in theory
some correlation between one primary goods bundle’s lifeplan-superiority over another
for me and a similar lifeplan-superiority for you, but again owing to those
aforementioned difficulties and related political constraints attending the would-be
consistently reliable observation, measurement and anything but “background” salience
of such ineluctably “private” or “subjective” imponderables as lifeplan-satisfaction, we
cannot ever know or maintain with full confidence or legitimacy that this relation holds
either; it too, like (2”), is a reasonable bit of “common sense,” “background knowledge,”
general supposition or “working hypothesis” in characterizing and implementing justice,
which includes selecting an appropriate distribuendum (premise (3”)). It seems to me
that this represents a fully coherent articulation of the (“pragmatic,” “political”) Rawlsian
view of primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction that not only avoids the inconsistency
found by Roemer in Rawls’s own articulation, but that also is truer – because more
thoroughgoing in it faithfulness – to Rawls’s own intuitions than is the literal Rawlsian
articulation itself (as quoted by Roemer) or Risse’s proposal simply to drop (2)).59
One particular “Rawlsian way out” noted above seems to cohere especially
attractively with this re-reading of the three Rawlsian premises. We observed, several
pages up, that (3a1”) and (4e”) were compatible. A ready intuitive interpretation of these
propositions pursuant to the general understanding of Rawls here proposed would run:
“Primary goods bundle m objectively equals or exceeds primary goods bundle n for
person a, but we cannot know or act as if we knew with certainty, even though it is safe
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as a matter of common sense to assume as “background knowledge” out from behind the
veil of ignorance, that it subjectively equals or exceeds that bundle for her; the latter is
simply a reasonable background supposition for the purposes of political justice” (3a1”).
And: “Not only can we not know or act as if we knew with certainty that primary goods
bundle m subjectively equals or exceeds bundle n for person a, we cannot know or act as
if we knew with certainty whether it does so for person b either; again, this is simply a
reasonable general supposition for the purposes of political justice” (4e”). Again, it
seems to me that these are entirely reasonable things to say, that they are consistent one
with the other, and that they are fully in conformity with the spirit of the intuitive reading
of the revised Rawlsian premises respecting primary goods and lifeplan-satisfaction
offered in the previous paragraph – a reading, and revisions, which again appear more
fully faithful to Rawlsian intuitions, as well as more internally harmonious, than are
Rawls’s articulated premises themselves. Other Rawlsian ways out assayed above are
perhaps more difficult to square with the proposed intuitive reading of the revised
premises. But we need but one set, and perhaps it will be well for now to leave things at
that.
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We could imagine a three-valued logic, for example, in which “∀ ⊃ ∃” is not equivalent to “¬∃
⊃ ¬∀”. If ∀ were assigned the third semantic value, construed, say, as “indeterminacy,” and ∃ were
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“¬” which “reversed” the valuation of a true or false sentential formula and left that of a third-valued
formula invariant.) And in intuitionist logic, in which tertium non datur does not hold, i.e. in which “∀ ∨
¬∀” is not tautologous, “¬∃ ⊃ ¬∀” does not entail “∀ ⊃ ∃”. More on these matters infra, Parts 3 and 4.2.
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I deliberately leave an ambiguity in the claim as stated. It might mean that it is not the case that
for all “you” and “I,” any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or exceeds another such bundle for me
if and only if it does so for you. (This is the rendering I have settled on and formalized below.) Or it might
mean that for all “you” and “I,” it is not the case that any primary goods bundle subjectively equals or
exceeds another such bundle for me if and only if it does so for you. (A formal rendering would be
“∀x,y,i,j: ¬ (x >s/i y ≡ x >s/j y).”) In a bivalent logic, the former rendition amounts to a claim that for at
least one pair of persons, one bundle will subjectively equal or exceed a second bundle for one of those
persons while the second bundle exceeds the first for the other person; whereas the second rendering would
be equivalent to the claim that for any two people, one bundle will subjectively equal or exceed another
bundle for one of those persons only when the other bundle exceeds it for the other person. The latter
seems surely to be a stronger claim than Rawls would wish to make. (Note, though, that his
incommensurability intuition would appear to stand in some tension with either – another reason to
consider departing from standard logics in Parts 3 and 4.) I leave the ambiguity in the informally stated
premise, however, because I believe Rawls implicitly to be relying on the possibility of trivalence or some
syntactic counterpart, in which case the two interpretations of (3) do not part ways so radically, and in
which case both seem worth considering. I treat the logical consequences of each interpretation under
conditions of trivalence – showing that one such set of consequences indeed properly includes the other –
in Part 3.
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incorporating (false) existential claims. Whitehead & Russell, note 13, pp. 66f., 173f.; B. Russell, “On
Denoting,” Mind 14 (1905): 479-93, reprinted in Russell (ed. R.C. Marsh), Logic and Knowledge: Essays
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Knowledge and Reality (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998), pp. 171-98; J. M. McDowell, “Truth-Value Gaps,” in
L. J. Cohen et al., eds., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982),
pp. 299-314, reprinted in McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, pp. 199-213; Putnam, Reason,
Truth and History, and Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3: Realism and Reason, note 48, passim.; and of course
the seminal W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays (Cambridge:
Harvard, 1959); and W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT, 1960).
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447-64; P. Hájek, Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998); V. Novák, Fuzzy Sets and
Their Applications (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1989); Gottwald, note 37, Chapters 18, 19; Bolc & Borowik,
note 37, Chapters 8, 9. Also B. Urquhart, “Many-Valued Logic,” in Gabbay & Guenthner, note 16, pp. 71116; M. A. E. Dummett, “Wang’s Paradox,” Synthese 30 (1975): 301-24, reprinted in Dummett, Truth and
Other Enigmas, note 48; and Hilary Putnam, “Vagueness and Alternative Logic,” Erkenntnis 19 (1983):
297-314, reprinted in Putnam, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3: Realism and Reason, note 48, pp. 271-86.
Precursors to “fuzzy logics” in the form of many-valued logics construed or construable as logics of
“partial truth” or “verisimilitude” are assayed in E. Post, “Introduction to the General Theory of Elementary
Propositions,” American Journal of Mathematics 43 (1921): 163-85; and K. M. Popper, Objective
Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). Many-valued logic construed as “probability logic” is investigated
by Jan Łukasiewicz, note 36, whose work is further discussed infra. Professor Dworkin briefly considers
vagueness as a possible reason for denying the decidability of legal questions in Dworkin, note 19.
17

Herewith a modified version of a well-known Aristotelian hypothetical. Aristotle, De
Interpretatione, Book ix, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: University Press, 1963).
18

I thus think it mistaken to argue, as some have done, that the Aristotelian objection to
determinately truth-valued future contingents involves a modal fallacy, viz., an illicit elision from “□ (∀ ⊃
∃)” to “∀ ⊃ □∃”. See S. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time (New Haven: Yale, 1967). Also A. N. Prior, “ThreeValued Logic and Future Contingents,” Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1983): 317-26; A. N. Prior, Time and
Modality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957). It is not necessary for Aristotle (or Łukasiewicz, discussed infra, Part
III.D, who endorses him) to argue to the necessity of a consequent from the necessity of the implication
involving that consequent. He need only argue that the present conferral of truth-value upon statements
involving the future must, to be intelligible, be warranted by some current state of the world; then that for
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any such state to meet the appointed task it must unalterably determine that future state. Cf. similar
observations in connection with “antirealism” about the past and about counterfactuals, infra Part 4.2.
19

John Lucas has famously – and controversially – argued that some of the very results derived by
Gödel, some recursive relatives of which one three-valued logic considered infra – Kleene’s – is designed
to accommodate, also supply a refutation of physical determinism. J.R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), pp. 114f. Also J. R. Lucas, “Minds, Machines and Gödel,” Philosophy 36
(1961): 112-27; J. R. Lucas, “Mechanism: A Rejoinder,” Philosophy 45 (1970): 149-51. Contra: David
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20

Of course, David Lewis, Counterfactuals. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973). Lewis is an unapologetic
realist with respect to the possible worlds in terms of which counterfactualist semantics are understood; but
he essays objections throughout his treatise. See also Dummett, note 48.
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Cf. remarks on intuitionism at Part 4.2, infra.
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John Broome apparently also would see none. See his “Incommensurable Values,” in Roger
Crisp & Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford:
University Press, 1999), pp. 21-38, reprinted in John Broome, Ethics Out of Economics (Cambridge:
University Press, 1999), pp. 145-61, at 154: “I take the question of vagueness as a red herring when we are
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Risse, note 2, argues that Rawls cannot renounce (1) because primary goods would then “lose
their ability to guide ‘interpersonal comparisons required for workable political principles,’” p. 16, quoting
Rawls, Restatement, note 14, p. 60. Neither can Rawls renounce (3), holds Risse, because “insisting on
utility comparability (which is what the rejection of that condition amounts to) would unacceptably
undermine the subjective element in any plausible conception of happiness,” p. 16. Risse concludes that
Rawls must renounce (2), even though this “comes at the expense of severing primary goods from
happiness,” p. 17. Roemer’s derived contradiction, Risse observes, thus “mak[es] clear how far-reaching
[Rawls’s contractarian] commitment is,” p. 22. The possible employment of non-classical logics, I think,
gives the lie to Risse’s parenthetical (that “insisting on utility comparability” is what rejection of premise
(3) “amounts to”). It also casts doubt upon his equating “meaningful[ness]” with “being true or false,
rather than pointless,” at the top of p. 15. And employing such a logic in revising both (2) and (3) enables
us both to retain all of Rawls’s premises – albeit in “softened” form – and to avoid the curious tension that
seems to me to afflict not only Rawls’s premises (2) and (3) considered jointly, but also Risse’s desire to
retain “the subjective element in any plausible conception of happiness” while at the same time “severing”
it completely (rather than only “softly,” as I do here) from the primary goods which Rawlsians –
reasonably, it seems to me – take to conduce, in some moral-theoretic and pragmatic sense not susceptible
of precise and reliable measurement, to plausible happiness. (Note again, in this connection, e.g., the
Rawlsian passage quoted by Roemer, note 1, at p. 166, and in note 7 supra.) The final three paragraphs of
this paper, I believe, convincingly indicate how the formalizations proposed in the remaining pages not
only spare Rawls the Roemerian inconsistency, but also lend themselves to a more plausible, more
intuitively complete account of primary goods and their relation to lifeplan-satisfaction than either Rawls or
Risse has quite mustered. Each of them, we might say, is ambivalent about subjectivity, while Risse (at
least) is unnecessarily bivalent about logic; solution lies in univalence about subjectivity and trivalence (or
its functional equivalent) about logic.
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There might, of course, be commensurability problems between non-identical bundles – that is,
there might be an indexing problem where one primary goods vector includes more of component x1 and
less of component x2 than does another primary goods vector – but this (considerable) problem need not
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concern us here. I treat it at length in my forthcoming “The Grammar of Distribution: A Metatheory of
Justice,” and “Market-Able Justice: Endowment Equality, Value-Grounded Departures from Equality, and
Social Exchange.” For more on the matter, see Richard Arneson, “Primary Goods Reconsidered,” NOUS 24
(1990): 429-57; Richard Arneson, “Rawls versus Utilitarianism in the Light of Political Liberalism,” in V.
Davian & C. Wolf, eds., The Idea of Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000). Also Roemer, note 1, and Risse, note 2. More generally, Broome, note 28, and Chang,
note 45. All of these contributions can be can be taken, in effect, for close critiques of premise (1), while
the present paper is primarily a critique of premises (2) and (3).
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Rawls, Restatement, note 14, pp. 60-61.
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Professor Roemer has suggested, in conversation, that reformalizing the Rawlsian premises
pursuant to a non-classical logic might constitute too radical or far-reaching a maneuver, leaving
“everything up for grabs.” I don’t think that we need harbor such worries – worries which, incidentally,
seem often to bedevil gifted and scrupulous mathematicians when confronted by non-classical logics. (Cf.
Ramsey on intuitionism’s “Bolshevik menace,” note 48.) As I hope to have indicated in the discussion
throughout Parts III and IV, the non-classical logics considered in the present paper depart from classical
logic only in their formal recognitions of meaningful propositions of somehow (metaphysically,
epistemically, politically-pragmatically, etc.) indeterminate truth-value, their consequent assignments of
mildly divergent truth-functional meanings to the classical sentential connectives, and/or their sacrifice of
certain classical tautologies which, in view of the possibility of the aforementioned meaningful
propositions of indeterminate truth-value, probably ought not to be maintained in any event. Those logics
do not seem to pose any threat of unpleasant surprise derivable from Rawlsian premises interpreted in light
of the countenanced indeterminacies, nor do they seem to threaten any other surprise likely to be found
unpleasant by Rawlsians. (As I noted earlier, a full-blown metalogical proof might yield a bit more formal
confidence on this point – at least as regards possible contradictions – but the intuitive arguments ought to
suffice.) All that they do is to offer a means of giving formal expression to what looks to be Rawls’s actual
three-fold understanding of primary goods and their relation to lifeplan-satisfaction among persons, and to
do so in a manner that both a) preserves such relations of logical consequence as we should wish to retain
and b) avoids such paradox as that to which the aforementioned Rawlsian understanding, if mis-formalized
bivalently, would conduce. Professor Roemer also has suggested, again in conversation, that a more
critical inconsistency of which Rawls is guilty comes with his attempt to integrate considerations of
responsibility into his theory of justice via his accounts both of primary goods and of the “veil of
ignorance.” With this claim I am in considerable sympathy, and see no way out for Rawls via any plausible
formalization or reformalization. See generally cites to Arneson’s, Roemer’s and my own work at note 62;
also John Roemer, “Three Egalitarian Views and American Law,” Law and Philosophy, xx (2001): 433-60;
T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998); and Risse, note 2, as well as
Mathias Risse, “Rawls and Responsibility” (draft, 2 March 2003, on file with the author), who is at pains to
defend Rawls against this inconsistency charge. While Professor Risse’s emphasis on the political nature
of Rawlsian justice constitutes an important corrective to much criticism of Rawls, and provides what I
believe to be an additional rationale for reformalizing the Rawlsian premises as I have done in this paper
(rather than for simply dropping premise (2), as Professor Risse proposes), I do not believe that it spares
Rawls the difficulties over responsibility from which Risse hopes to extricate him. But that matter is
reserved for Hockett, note 62.

63

